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M
ainstream economists used to treat 
institutions as mere ‘details’. When they were 
criticized for the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme that ignored international differences in institutions, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund used to retort that what is good economics in 
the US is good economics in Ghana or Ecuador.
Institutions Matter—Suddenly
Then suddenly from the mid-1990s, everyone started emphasizing the role of 
institutions in economic development. Even the IMF and the World Bank have 
come around to the view that institutions matter. The IMF put great emphasis 
on reforming institutions of corporate governance and bankruptcy management 
during the 1997 Asian crisis, while the World Bank’s 2002 annual report (Building 
Institutions for Markets) focused on institutional development, albeit from a rather 
narrow point of view, as indicated by its title.
There are a few reasons behind this dramatic change in the intellectual 
atmosphere. First, the institution-free technocratic reform programmes of the 1980s 
have almost universally failed. Second, a number of devastating large-scale financial 
crises in developing countries around the turn of the century (Mexico in 1995, Asia 
in 1997, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, Argentina in 2002) have prompted debates 
on the need for reforming a range of institutions in order to prevent and deal with 
such crises (financial, corporate governance, bankruptcy, labour market, and social 
welfare institutions). Third, there have been increasing attempts by the developed 
countries to ‘harmonize’ institutions across countries in the name of introducing 
‘global-standard’ institutions to developing countries. Fourth, there have been some 
important theoretical developments in institutional economics—not only the rise 
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Despite the heightened interest in 
institutions, there are still some 
important gaps in our understanding of 
the relationship between institutional 
change and economic development.
First of all, we still do not know 
which institutions in exactly what forms 
are useful for economic development in 
which contexts. For example, everyone 
may agree that a ‘good’ property rights 
system is essential for economic 
development, but what is in fact a 
‘good’ property rights system? That 
it is not necessarily Western-style 
private property rights system should 
be clear from the excellent economic 
performance of China over the last two 
decades.
Second, even when we can identify 
a particular institution as beneficial in 
a given context, we often do not know 
how we can build such institution. 
The standard recommendation is to 
import ‘best practice’, or ‘global standard’, 
institutions wholesale. Yet, the volume 
shows, successful institutional changes 
typically emerge as a mixture of 
country-specific innovation and chance 
developments as well as deliberate 
learning from the more advanced 
countries.
In order to fill these intellectual 
gaps, we first need to develop new 
discourses on what may be called the 
‘technology of institution building’. 
For example, it is not enough to say 
that developing countries need better 
fiscal institutions. We need to be able 
to tell them, for example: which forms 
of taxes are more appropriate in which 
economic and political contexts and 
for what social purposes; how different 
forms of political resistance to different 
taxes may be overcome; and how best 
an effective tax collection machinery can 
be built.
Second, we need more case studies 
of institution building—historical 
and more recent. Real life experiences 
of institution building are often 
‘stranger than fiction’—that is, they 
are often more imaginative than what 
theoreticians have suggested on the 
basis of broad generalization and 
abstract reasoning.
Against ‘Institutional  
Mono-tasking’
Institutions can, and do, serve multiple 
functions. For example, budgetary 
institutions serve functions such 
as investment in productive assets 
(e.g., physical infrastructure, R&D 
facilities), provision of social protection 
(the welfare state), and increasing 
macroeconomic stability (e.g., through 
its ‘automatic stabiliser’ function).
The functional multiplicity 
of institutions makes the task of 
institution building complicated, as 
there is no inevitable relationship 
between a desired function and an 
institutional form. Unfortunately, in the 
mainstream discourse on institutions 
and development, there has been a 
tendency to assign a single function 
to each institutional form, or what 
Thandika Mkandawire aptly called 
‘institutional mono-tasking’ in the 
project conference—the central bank 
should focus on inflation control, 
corporate governance institutions 
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The failure to understand the 
functional multiplicity of institutions 
means a failure to fully exploit the 
potential of an institution. Epstein’s 
chapter shows that there are many 
‘developmental’ functions that the 
central bank can and have played (e.g., 
support for government-targeted 
industries, promotion of the financial 
sector), but that they have become 
increasingly neglected because of the 
currently dominant view that the 
sole function of the central bank is to 
guarantee price stability.
‘Institutional mono-tasking’ also 
makes it easier for particular interest 
groups to hijack certain institutions 
and make them work mainly to their 
advantages, when those institutions 
can, and should, serve other interests 
too. Lazonick’s chapter shows how 
shareholder-oriented institutions of 
corporate governance have allowed 
shareholders to assert their interests 
over those of other stakeholders in the 
firm and of the broader society.
Moreover, ‘institutional mono-
tasking’ increases the danger that 
countries import certain institutions 
for one function without thinking 
about their other functions. For 
example, a developing country may 
import shareholder-oriented corporate 
governance institutions, thinking 
that the only roles for corporate 
governance institutions are to control 
managerial excesses and to prevent 
expropriation of minority shareholders 
by dominant shareholders. However, 
the imported institutions may ill-serve 
other functions—for example, the 
management of conflict with workers or 
local communities.
‘Appearances can be Deceptive’
The absence of one-to-one mapping 
between forms and functions of 
institutions means that ‘appearances 
can be deceptive’, when it comes to 
institutions. This is because institutions 
do not function in a vacuum but 
interact with other institutions—as 
evidenced by the frequent failure of 
many imported institutions to take root.
The problem of compatibility will be 
more severe in relation to informal (that 
is, non-codified) institutions. When 
introducing a new institution, it may be 
possible to change all the ‘surrounding’ 
formal institutions by re-writing all the 
relevant laws, but it is impossible to 
change the informal institutions (e.g., 
customs, business practices) in a short 
span of time.
Using the example of Malaysia, 
whose common-law tradition was 
compromised by the all-powerful Prime 
Minister’s desire to use East Asian-
style administrative guidance arising 
out of the civil law tradition, Woo 
shows in her chapter that the formal 
legal system cannot fully determine 
how decisions are made and conflicts 
resolved. Zhu’s chapter also clearly 
demonstrates that, despite the apparent 
differences in their formal institutional 
forms, the actual institutional matrixes 
that have supported rapid economic 
transformations in China and Taiwan 
are remarkably similar to each other.
The Political Origins of 
Institutions
Institution building cannot simply be a 
technocratic exercise. All institutions, 
including the market (which is often 
assumed by mainstream economists 
not to be an institution) are defined in 
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relation to the structure of the rights 
and obligations of the relevant actors. 
As the definition of those rights and 
obligations is ultimately a political act, 
no institution, including the market, can 
be seen as being free from politics.
David and Mach show how the 
Swiss central bank was created as a 
mixed (part public and part private) 
company with majority shares owned 
by the Cantons, to allay the fears by 
the private sector and the Cantons 
of dominance by a centralized public 
institution. Burlamaqui, Pereira de 
Souza, and Barbosa Filho shows how 
political compromises have affected 
institutional reform in Brazil, whose 
solutions have affected the subsequent 
evolution of the economy—the effect of 
wage indexation on subsequent episodes 
of inflation being the best example.
The volume shows that the politics 
involved in institution-building process 
can often be very unpleasant. The 
efficient tax institutions of early modern 
Britain fuelled its imperialist expansion 
and repression of lower classes at 
home in the name of protecting private 
property (O’Brien). The American 
federal system, while allowing the ‘losers’ 
of the nineteenth-century globalization 
to partially protect themselves, also 
preserved institutions that persecuted 
the blacks and the poor in the southern 
states (Rauchway). The South African 
tax system’s exceptional ability (among 
developing countries) to tax the rich 
ultimately originated from the country’s 
shameful history of apartheid (di John).
At one level, these ‘dark’ origins 
of certain institutions limit their 
applicability. For example, few would 
recommend that developing countries 
create institutions that repress the 
poor to emulate the British economic 
success in the eighteenth century. Nor 
would anyone argue that the South 
African experiences shows us that we 
need exclusionary politics in order to 
build a good tax base. However, as we 
shall soon see, institutions can be used 
for purposes that were not originally 
intended, and therefore the ‘darkness’ 
of their origins need not keep us from 
using them for better purposes.
‘Red vs. Expertise’
Having emphasized the importance 
of politics in institutional changes, it 
has to be pointed out that political 
compromise alone is not enough 
in making positive and durable 
institutional changes. The chapters 
by Epstein on the central bank and 
Toye on modern bureaucracy show 
particularly well that ‘technocratic’ 
details matter greatly in determining 
the benefits and the sustainability of 
institutions.
The analogy will be a family having 
an internal feud over what kind of 
house they will build in their plot 
of land. Deciding the kind of house 
they want to build is arguably the 
most important first step that may 
require a lot of fights and compromises 
(‘politics’). However, even if the family 
was able to forge a durable consensus 
on the kind of house to build, without 
skilled architects and builders 
(‘technocracy’), it may not be able to 
build a good house that will last.
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In other words, the emphasis on 
politics should not be misinterpreted 
as a denunciation of technocratic 
expertise in the Maoist fashion (‘red’ 
over ‘expertise’). Poor ‘technical’ design 
of an institution may ultimately 
undermine its political legitimacy by 
creating discontent even among its main 
beneficiaries (e.g., the poor design of 
a state pension system may ultimately 
discredit state pension itself). 
Structure vs. Human Agency
In the mainstream theory of 
institutional change, there is no real 
human agency. In the theory, material 
interests that motivate people to change 
institutions are pre-determined by 
‘objective’ economic (or even natural) 
conditions. Therefore, there is no 
meaningful choice, because what a 
‘rational’ actor will choose is already 
structurally determined. However, 
history has developed the way it has 
because someone somewhere made 
choices that were not ‘obvious’ according 
to the structural parameters.
For example, Kiiza shows, Botswana 
has developed well because its political 
leaders made certain deliberate political 
decisions about the appropriation of 
diamond rent and its use. Evans points 
out that, despite similar economic and 
social conditions, the political elites of 
Guatemala in the nineteenth century 
decided to concentrate property in a 
small class of landlords while their 
counterparts in Costa Rica opted for a 
more broad-based property ownership, 
with very different consequences for 
growth, income distribution, and social 
peace.
The emphasis on the role of human 
agency brings us to the issue of the 
role of ideas in institutional change. 
If human actors are not automata 
responding to structurally-determined 
incentives, their ideas—how they 
perceive their interests, what their 
moral values are, how they think the 
world works, what actions they think 
are possible and impossible, and so 
on—matter a great deal.
Sometimes ideas can be used as 
tools by human agents in their attempt 
to change institutions in the way that 
they prefer. Lazonick shows how the 
American professional managerial class 
has been able to use the shareholder-
value ideology, which identifies it as 
main targets of restraint, in a way that 
allowed it to build institutions that 
enrich itself (e.g., stock options).
However, ideas are not merely tools 
that human actors cynically manipulate 
in order to make the institutional 
changes that they prefer. Institutions 
affect the ideas that human actors hold, 
and therefore they shape the human 
actors. In other words, ideas may not be 
totally manipulated by human actors. 
Zhu’s chapter shows how the ‘socialist’ 
institutions of Taiwan and China have 
subsequently affected the way their 
policymakers behaved, while Woo’s 
chapter shows how the centralized 
political and bureaucratic institutions 
made the Korean policymakers 
liberalize the economy after the 1997 
crisis often through illiberal means.
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Unintended Consequences and 
Intended Perversions
Emphasizing human agency does 
not imply that those who plan and 
implement institutional changes can 
be certain about the consequences of 
their actions. There are unintended 
consequences of institutional change. 
Unintended consequences may be 
positive or negative. Toye shows that 
the US Tenure of Office Act (1820) 
gave the President and the Senate the 
power to re-appoint every office in the 
government, with the laudable intention 
of preventing the emergence of an 
official aristocracy able to pass office on 
to its children. However, it also had the 
negative unintended consequence of 
preventing the development of modern 
bureaucracy. Rauchway shows that the 
inability (and unwillingness) of the US 
federal government to impose fiscal 
discipline on the state governments 
produced the positive unintended 
consequences by encouraging the 
development of investment banking.
The failures of certain institutions 
to serve their original functions may 
not always be unintended. Some actors 
may deliberately chose to use them for 
purposes other than the original ones. 
When discussing how patents may be 
turned into vehicles of rent-seeking 
(as in the case of Britain at the time of 
Adam Smith) or even an obstacle to 
innovation (as in the recent extension 
of patents to the genetic level), Reinert 
shows how there can be ‘institutional 
perversion’. 
However, ‘institutional perversion’ 
need not be a negative thing. For 
example, the chapter by di John shows 
that, despite its ‘dark’ (apartheid) 
origins, the (rather effective) 
institutions of taxation in South 
Africa are slowly beginning to be 
used for redistributive purposes. Such 
‘perversion’ may be considered positive 
by many people. An institution need 
not have a ‘noble’ pedigree in order to be 
utilized for good purposes.
The ‘Technology’ of Institution 
Building
The volume emphasizes the diversity 
of institutions across time and place. 
However, this should not be interpreted 
as saying that there are no common 
principles in the ‘technology of 
institution building’ that can be applied 
across countries.
One principle that is relatively well-
known is that institutions may suddenly 
become obsolete because of some new 
challenges arise that they cannot meet. 
Evans shows this when discussing the 
case of Botswana, where the lack of 
mobilization mechanisms in the old 
institutional arrangement proved to 
be the major obstacle to the country’s 
management of HIV/AIDS crisis.
A less well-known principle that the 
volume identifies is that institutional 
reform may be more effectively initiated 
by introducing desired economic 
activities than by introducing the 
desired institutions. Reinert’s chapter 
argues that ‘an institutional system 
is mainly moulded around the needs 
determined by the mode of production, 
not the other way around’ and therefore 
that policymakers should target ‘the 
kind of activities that would bring the 
right kinds of institutions, not the 
other way around’. This is an extremely 
important antidote to the currently 
prevalent thinking that development 
can be promoted by introducing the 
‘right’ kind of institutions. 
Moreover, even when we agree that 
some institution is likely to be ‘good’ 
for almost all countries at least for 
some purpose, there is always a danger 
of what Reinert calls ‘institutional 
overdose’. Chang’s theoretical chapter 
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private property is absolutely necessary, 
it is wrong to infer from that the 
stronger the protection is the better it is, 
as the conventional wisdom goes. In the 
same way life-saving or health-giving 
drugs can turn into poisons if taken 
in too large quantities, an ‘overdose’ of 
an institution that may be beneficial at 
some level may be harmful for economic 
development.
Concluding Remarks
The volume shows that there is no 
universal formula for institutional 
change that will promote economic 
development. Functional multiplicity, 
the importance of informal institutions, 
unintended consequences, and intended 
‘perversion’ of institutions all imply 
that importation of ‘best practice’ 
formal institutions does not guarantee 
any particular positive outcome, even 
assuming that the imported institution 
can actually take root in the importing 
country.
The fact that there is no set formula, 
however, should not make us think that 
there is nothing we can do to improve 
the quality of institutions in developing 
countries.
First of all, being late-comers, 
developing countries have the benefit of 
being able to imitate institutions that 
exist in the more developed countries—
of course, with due local adaptations—
and thus cut down the costs associated 
with developing new institutions de 
novo.
Second, historical experiences 
show that countries do not have to 
start with high-quality institutions. 
Institutional development is partly a 
consequence, rather than a cause, of 
economic development. Moreover, it is 
perfectly possible to improve the quality 
of institutions while the country is 
developing its economies, with both of 
them feeding into each other. 
Third, despite the difficulties 
of identifying a better ‘technology 
of institution building’, there are 
some general principles that may be 
extracted that can help countries build 
better institutions. For example, if 
it is difficult to change deep-rooted 
institutions through political means, 
it may be possible to change them by 
introducing new economic activities 
that create demand for different kinds 
of institutions. For another example, we 
can take heart from the fact that some 
institutions with ‘dark’ political origins 
have been ‘perverted’ into serving good 
purposes.
There is no universal formula for 
institutional development. However, 
even in this inherently complex area, 
it is possible to extract some general 
principles and enrich our empirical 
knowledge, especially if we are willing to 
go beyond the rather narrow theoretical 
and empirical confines of today’s 
orthodox discourse on institutions.
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Institutions matter, but what 
are good institutions, how do 
they emerge or how do we 
build them?